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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between board independence and accounting conservatism among Malaysian companies 
in year 2000 until 2012. What triggers the researchers to carry out this study is that studies found that the implementation of 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance to Malaysian companies has created a higher confidence level to investors and 
enhances the company’s image. Further, one of the elements of good corporate governance is the board independence. 
However, few studies discuss on accounting conservatism. It is argued that accounting conservatism is an effective mechanism 
to address the agency problem. Based on the findings, interestingly, this study found that higher board independence does not 
align with higher conservatism. Instead, the independent non-executive directors do not actually have the power of 
‘independence’, monitoring and advising the board of directors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was issued in March 2000. It marked a significant milestone in 
corporate governance reforms in Malaysia. The Code became effective through the revamped Listing 
Requirements of the KLSE in January 2001. Since the release of the Code, the Malaysian corporate scene has 











* Corresponding author. Tel.: +60194001118. 
E-mail address: afza@uum.edu.my 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the School of Accountancy, College of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia.
404   Noor Afza Amran and Kamarul Bahrain Abdul Manaf /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  164 ( 2014 )  403 – 408 

made significant strides in corporate governance standards. Later a revised version of the Code was released in 
2007. The key amendments to the revised Code were aimed at strengthening the board of directors and audit 
committees, and ensuring that the board of directors and audit committees discharge their roles and responsibilities 
effectively. The KLSE-PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate Governance Survey 2002 found that the reform in 
Malaysia is headed in the right direction. The survey results indicate that 93% of the investors surveyed felt that 
Malaysia’s standard of corporate governance has improved since the introduction of the Code in 2000. 
Corporate governance complements conservatism in facilitating contracting in that it promotes conservatism to 
be adopted in financial reporting (Fama & Jensen, 1983). A number of studies examine the association of board 
characteristics with the quality of financial reporting. Beasley (1996), Dechow et al. (1996) and Farber (2005) find 
that the percentage of outside directors is negatively related to the likelihood of fraud. Peasnell et al. (2000), Klein 
(2002) and Xie et al. (2003) document a negative relationship between the percentage of outside directors and 
proxies for earnings management. Wright (1997) reports a positive relationship between the percentage of outside 
directors and analyst ratings of financial reporting quality.  
Accounting conservatism is found to be an important elements in good quality financial reporting (Ball, Robin, 
& Wu, 2003; Beekes, Pope, & Young, 2004; Fan & Wong, 2002). Accounting conservatism requires a firm to 
recognize losses more quickly than gains. It understates earnings and net assets, and thereby it reduces the ability 
of managers to engage in activities that will benefit themselves. It is argued that accounting conservatism is an 
effective mechanism to address agency problem. It is a useful tool for the board of director to fulfil its role in 
monitoring manager (Watt, 2003; Ahmed & Duellman, 2007). Thus, by having strong corporate governance and 
higher accounting conservatism, it will enhance the quality of financial reporting of the company. 
Given that the role of the board of director is to monitor manager behaviour and accounting conservatism is a 
good measure to address agency problem, it is important to understand the link between board independence and 
accounting conservatism. In this paper, this study will examine the association of board characteristics with 
accounting conservatism. The contribution of this paper is that shed evidence whether firms with effective board 
characteristics employ accounting conservatism as a tool to address agency problem.  
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
 
The release of the Code has marked the importance of corporate governance in Malaysia. Corporate 
governance in Malaysia is established based on the Anglo-Saxon approach, as in the US and UK. The Code was 
mainly derived from the recommendations in the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Hampel Report (1998) in the UK. 
The Code was issued in March 2000. It marked a significant milestone in corporate governance reform in 
Malaysia. The Code consists of the principles, best practices of good governance, optimal corporate governance 
structures and internal processes. The Code became effective through the revamped Listing Requirements of the 
KLSE in January 2001. Since the release of the Code, the Malaysian corporate scene has made significant strides 
in corporate governance standards. The mandatory reporting of compliance with the Code has enabled 
shareholders and the public to assess and determine the standards of corporate governance by listed companies.  
Later a revised version of the Code was released in 2007 and latest in 2012. The revised Code (2012) represents 
the continued collaborative efforts between the Government and industry. The key amendments to the revised 
Code were aimed at strengthening the board of directors and audit committees, and ensuring that the board of 
directors and audit committees discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively. A survey on corporate 
governance has been conducted in year 2006 by Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) and Nottingham 
University Business School (NUBS) with the objective to measure the level of compliance of top 200 public listed 
companies. The main findings indicate that the level of compliance of the top 200 PLCs with the Code and best 
practices is rising and that for a number of PLCs, the level was approaching maximum compliance as reflected by 
the basic compliance score. However, the findings of the international best practices imply that generally 
Malaysian PLCs are still lagging behind in competitiveness with recommended best practices not already enjoined 
by the Code.  
405 Noor Afza Amran and Kamarul Bahrain Abdul Manaf /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  164 ( 2014 )  403 – 408 



2.2 Accounting conservatism 
 
In relation to corporate governance issues, accounting conservatism is an effective mechanism to reduce agency 
problem as it curbs managers’ opportunistic behaviour. It reduces the ability of managers to overstate earnings and 
net assets (Watts, 2003). Furthermore, accounting conservatism discourages managers to invest in negative NPV 
projects or poorly performing investments as they are unable to defer recognition of losses to the future (Ball & 
Shivakumar, 2005). Habib and Hossain (2013) evidenced that in Australia, accounting conservatism positively 
affects a firm’s leverage structure. 
Prior research indicated that accounting conservatism is associated with high quality financial reporting. For 
example, Hu, Li and Zhang (2014) found that conservatism positively associated with the improvement of 
corporate information environment. Conservatism is more pronounced in countries with weaker protection of 
property rights. Accounting conservatism is higher for firms that have good corporate governance mechanisms. 
Firms with a higher proportion of outside directors recognize losses on a timelier basis than firms with fewer 
outside directors (Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Lara, Osma & Penalve, 2007). LaFond and 
Roychowdhury (2008) and Cullinan et al. (2012) find that accounting conservatism is negatively associated with 
managerial ownership. Study in US found that banks with effective governance structures practice higher levels of 
accounting conservatism (Leventis, Dimitropoulos & Owusu-Ansah, 2013). 
 
2.3 Board independence 
 
One of the components of corporate governance is the board independence. Board independence is measured 
by its composition. For effective monitoring, the board of directors should consist of the right number of 
independent non-executive directors. According to Hillman and Dalziel (2003), the board is independent when 
there are a significant proportion of independent non-executive directors. Non-executive directors are more 
effective in monitoring managers and protecting the interest of shareholders and thereby reducing agency problem 
(Brickley & James, 1987; Weisbach, 1988; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Craven & Wallace, 2001). Fama (1980) and 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that non-executive directors enhance the effectiveness of internal control as most 
non-executive directors are important decision agents in other corporations. Ahmed and Henry (2012) found that 
firms voluntarily adopting perceived best practice corporate governance mechanisms (voluntarily audit committee 
formation, increasing board independence and decreasing board size) employ unconditional accounting 
conservatism as a complimentary agency control device. 
The Code recommends that non-executive directors should be persons of calibre, credibility and possess 
necessary skills and experience. Furthermore, at least one third of the board members should consist of 
independent non-executive directors for the board to be effective. According to Abdullah (2001), boards of 
directors of Malaysian firms are generally dominated by non-executive directors. Prior studies indicate that board 
independence promotes high quality financial reporting. Study by Lin, Fan and Cheng (2012) show that listed 
companies in China have accounting conservatism in their accounting policies. The increasing percentage of 
independent directors in the board benefits the improvement of accounting conservatism. Peasnell et al. (2000), 
Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003) and Bowen et al. (2005) document that earnings management is low when the 
percentage of outside directors is high. Studies in Malaysia, however, find that there is no relationship between 
non-executive directors and earnings management (Mohd-Salleh et al., 2005; Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 
2006). Agency theory suggests that higher proportion of non-executive directors increases the effectiveness of the 
board. Prior studies indicate that higher proportion of non-executive directors on board to be more conservative 
(Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Lim, 2011). Based on the arguments above, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Higher proportion of independent non-executive directors lead to higher accounting conservatism for 
companies. 
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3. Research method 
 
3.1 Sample 
 
This study uses the company annual reports and financial database from year 2000 to 2012 in gathering the 
necessary information for 866 companies except for banking and other finance related companies. Year 2000 to 
2012 were selected because researchers want to examine the pre (2000 &2007) and post (2012) effect of 
MCCG.The data on company annual reports were retrieved from the Bursa Malaysia. The financial data were 
extracted from the Thomson Advance Database.  
 
3.2 Research model and measurement 
 
This study uses Basu’s (1997) measure as our measure of conservatism. Basu defines conservatism as earnings 
capture bad news faster than good news. Using stock returns to proxy for good and bad news, Basu expected that 
in a reverse regression of earnings on stock returns, a higher association of earnings with negative stock returns 
than with positive stock returns would be observed. Basu’s regression model is as follow: 
Et = β0 + β1Dt + β2Rt + β3DtRt +   
where  Et is annual earnings deflated by the beginning of period market value, Rt is a twelve-month stock return, Dt 
is a dummy variable that equals one if stock return is negative and equals zero otherwise, and  is the residual 
term. The coefficient β3measures the sensitivity of earnings to negative stock returns and it is expected to be 
positive and significant when earnings are more sensitive to negative stock returns than to positive stock returns. 
We extend the Basu (1997) model by including the variables for board characteristics variables to examine the 
association of board independence with accounting conservatism. The estimating equation is as follow: 
Et = β0 + β1Dt + β2Rt + β3DtRt +   
 
Et = β0 + β1Dt + β2Rt + β3DtRt + β4INDEPENDENCEt + β5INDEPENDENCEt.Dt + β6INDEPENDENCEt.Rt + 
β7INDEPENDENCEt.Dt.Rt +   
where Et is annual earnings deflated by the beginning of period market value, Dtis a dummy variable that equals 
one if stock return is negative and equals zero otherwise, Rtis a twelve-month stock return, INDEPENDENCEt 
represents board independence that equals one when the number of non-executive directors is above the sample 
median and equals zero otherwise.  
 
4. Findings and discussion 
 
Based on the analysis in Table 1, Model 1 shows that the value of stock return is significant (coef. = 0.017, 
p=0.013) and when stock return interact with the dummy value, it also show a positive significant effect (coef. = 
0.125, p=0.000). This implies that stock return is sensitive to change in time. Model 2 reveals that board 
independence is negatively related with accounting conservatism (coef. = -0.089, p=0.052). This indicates that 
even the number of independent non-executive directors is high, but shows a low level of conservatism. The 
independent non-executive directors actually perform little role of monitoring the board because they are lack of 
real independence, time, as well as not enough information (Gilson & Kraakman, 1991; Patton & Baker, 1987). 
Our findings also contradict with previous studies (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Lara, Osma & Penalve, 2007). 
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Table 1: Regression Results for Earnings on Stock Returns and Board Independence 
 Model 1a  Model 2b 
  Intercept 0.078*** 
(0.000) 
 0.077*** 
(0.000) 
  D 0.004 
(0.464) 
 0.003 
(0.670) 
  R 0.017** 
(0.013) 
 0.011 
(0.144) 
  D*R 0.125*** 
(0.000) 
 0.144*** 
(0.000) 
  INDEPENDENCE   0.002 
(0.752) 
  INDEPENDENCE*D   0.003 
(0.813) 
  INDEPENDENCE*R   0.019 
(0.864) 
  INDEPENDENCE*D*R   -0.089** 
(0.052) 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% (figures in the parentheses are the p-values). 
aEt = β0 + β1Dt + β2Rt + β3DtRt + et  
bEt = β0 + β1Dt + β2Rt + β3DtRt + β4INDEPENDENCEt + β5INDEPENDENCEt.Dt + β6INDEPENDENCEt.Rt + β7INDEPENDENCEt.Dt.Rt + et 
Et is annual earnings deflated by the beginning of period market value, Rtis a twelve-month stock return measured from eight months prior to 
the fiscal year through four months after the fiscal year end, Dtis a dummy variable that equals one if stock return is negative and equals zero 
otherwise, INDEPENDENCE represents board independence that equals one when the number of non-executive directors is above the sample 
median and equals zero otherwise, and   is the residual term. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In a nutshell, the role of independent non-executive directors is still lacking behind in influencing the 
accounting conservatism. Even though the Code has been introduced for nearly 13 years, but yet the effectiveness 
of role of independent non-executive directors is still being questioned. The Code is being complied in terms of 
composition, but not the role of the independent non-executive directors. In terms of theory and practical 
contribution, corporate governance theory is applied in practice. However, future research may consider interview 
method to enrich the data collection and findings of the study. 
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